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NOTES AND COMMENTS
These factors are of only superficial value in the rationalization of
the rule; they do not eliminate any of the inherent objections. A more
satisfactory and stable result might be reached if the courts would
recognize the pendency of the appeal from the judgment offered as a
defense as a valid basis for a continuance. 13 It should be mentioned,
however, that in view of the crowded condition of the appellate calendar
in Oklahoma' 4 the continuance suggested might have to be of extraordinary duration.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
Practice and Procedure--Judgment of Nonsuit as Bar
to Subsequent Action.
The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of nonsuit on the ground
that plaintiff by her own testimony had shown that she was guilty of
contributory negligence.' Within one year thereafter she brought another suit on the same cause of action. A motion to dismiss for the
reason that the first suit was res adjudicata was granted. On appeal
this judgment was reversed. It was error to dismiss the second suit
unless it appeared from an examination of the pleadings and hearing
Sutton v. Dunn, 176 N. C. 202 96 S. E. 947 (1918) (appeal from a magistrate's

court to the Superior Court) ; Moss v. Taylor, 73 Utah 277, 273 Pac. 515 (1928)
(appeal from a Municipal Court to the District Court). Contra: Spokane Ry. Co. v.
Spokane County, 75 Wash. 72, 134 Pac. 688 (1913) (appeal from a ruling of the
Public Service Commission to the District Court). Second, the rule is applicable
where the judgment was rendered by the trial court of general jurisdiction and the
appeal is to the general appellate court. Ransom v. City of Pierre, 101 Fed. 665
(C. C. A. 8th, 1900); E. I. Du Pont Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 580
(C. C. A. 4th, 1924) (judgment rendered by a Federal District Court sitting in
North Carolina) ; Boynton v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 84 Ark. 203, 105 S. W.
77 (1907) ; Bank of North America v. Wheeler, 28 Conn. 433 (1859); Reese v.
Damato, 44 Fla. 692, 33 So. 462 (1902) ; Cain v. Williams, 16 Nev. 426 (1882) ;
see Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. 337 (C. C. D. Cal. 1885) ; see also the dissent of Lord,
C. J., Day v. Holland, 15 Ore. 464, 15 Pac. 855 (1887). Contra: Watson v. Richardson, 110 Iowa 698, 80 N. W. 416 (1899) (where a supersedeas bond is posted
the judgment will be res adjudicataregardless of the fact that the appeal will result in a hearing de novo).
=Robinson v. El Centro Grain Co., 133 Cal. App. 567, 24 P. (2d) 554 (1933) ;
McCusker v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 106 N. J. L. 116, 148 AtI. 897 (1930) ;
Paine v. Schenectady Insurance Co., 11 R. I. 411 (1876) ("We will add, however, as a matter of practice, that we think the pendency of the appeal in New
York may be good ground for delaying the judgment here until the appeal is disposed of; for otherwise we may give the judgment here a permanently conclusive
effect, whereas in New York, if the appeal is successful, it will be conclusive
'only for a short time").
(1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 148.
'Batson v. City Laundry Co., 205 N. C. 93, 170 S. E. 136 (1933). On a previous appeal in the same case it was held that the trial court was without authority
to set aside a verdict for insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law and then
grant a motion for nonsuit made at the close of all the evidence and renewed
after the verdict had been set aside. Batson v. City Laundry Co., 202 N. C. 560,
163 S. E. 600 (1932).
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the evidence on the trial that it was substantially the same as the first
2

suit.

The courts have generally held that a judgment of nonsuit, voluntary or involuntary, does not operate as a bar to another action.3 North
Carolina adhered to the general rule until the case of Hampton v. Rex
Spinniing Co., 4 where it was held that a former judgment of nonsuit
will operate as a bar to a second action if in the second action th
plaintiff introduces substantially the same pleadings and substantially
the same evidence as that offered in the first suit.
This departure from the general rule is commendable in that it
carries out the policy against a multiplicity of suits. As applied in the
instant case, however, the rule is subject to this criticism: the plaintiff
can omit the evidence of her contributory negligence in a subsequent
suit. Thus her evidence will be substantially altered, and the former
judgment will not be res adjudicata. In doing so she has avoided the
effect of having shown in the first suit that she was not entitled to
recover as a matter of law. This would not be prejudicial to the defendant but for the fact that there was no practical way for the
defendant to get a final judgment in the first action. Since the plaintiff's evidence did not entitle her to go to the jury, the defendant had
only a choice between a motion for nonsuit or motion for a directed
verdict. A motion for a directed verdict would usually be unavailing,
since plaintiff can always take a nonsuit to avoid the effect of a directed
verdict.5 The result might be that the plaintiff will eventually win a
suit which at one time she has shown as a matter of law that she was
not entitled to win. 6
It is submitted, therefore, that in addition to holding a judgment
of nonsuit res adjudicata when in a second suit the plaintiff fails to introduce a substantially different case from the one previously presented,
our court should also hold a nonsuit res adjudicata when it has been
granted because of plaintiff's showing as a matter of law that he was
2

Batson v. City Laundry Co., 206 N. C.371, 174 S. E. 90 (1934).
'Gardner v. Michigan Central R. Co., 150 U. S. 349, 14 Sup. Ct. 140, 37 L. ed.

1107 (1893) ; Mohn v. Tingley, 194 Cal. 470, 217 Pac. 733 (1923) ; Spring Valley

Coal Co. v. Patting, 210 Ill. 342, 71 N. E. 371 (1904) ; Sander v. New Orleans &
N. E. R. Co., 139 La. 85, 71 So. 238 (1916); Qualls v. Fowler, 186 S. W. 256
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
'198 N. C. 235, 151 S. E. 266 (1930).
'McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929)
6 Of course, testimony of her contributory negligence given by

§574.
plaintiff as a

witness in the first trial would be competent evidence in the second trial, since it

was clearly an admission. 2 and 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§1048,
1387(3). And there is some authority that testimony given by any other of
plaintiff's witnesses might also be admissible under this theory. Keyser Canning
Co. v. Klots Throwing Co., 98 W. Va., 487, 128 S. E. 280 (1925); 2 WIGMORE,
EvmENcE (2d ed. 1923) §1075. Also the pleadings on the former trial are admis-

sible; 2

WIGmoRE,

EviDENcE (2d ed. 1923) §1066.
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not entitled to recover. This view is supported by authority in other
7
jurisdictions.
FRANKLIN T. DuppEE, JR.
Practice and Procedure-judgment by Default and InquiryEvidence Relevant to Damages.
The plaintiff's car was demolished by defendant's truck in an accident due to the alleged negligence of the truck driver. Judgment was
by default and inquiry; evidence offered to prove that the accident resulted from plaintiff's negligence was ruled inadmissible. Held A
judgment by default admits the cause of action, but on the inquiry defendant fs entitled to establish facts in mitigation of damages. Evidence showing how the accident occurred is competent, therefore, not
as a bar to liability, but to show the amount of damages properly assessable on the inquiry.'
In North Carolina, the rule is well settled that a judgment by default and inquiry establishes a cause of action of the kind properly
pleaded in the complaint ;2 plaintiff's right at least to nominal damages ;3
and precludes defendant from offering any evidence in bar of the action. 4 Other state courts are in accord with the North Carolina view, 5
but this court is not clear in declaring what 'constitutes evidence in bar.
For instance, in an action for goods sold and delivered the defendant
was allowed to prove non-delivery ;6 but in another similar action, the
defendants' evidence that the goods were not delivered to themselves as
7
individuals but as officers of a buying corporation was inadmissible.
In the instant case, while saying that the judgment admits the cause
'Ordway v. Boston R. Co., 69 N. H. 429, 45 Atf. 243 (1899); Morrow v.
Atlanta & C. A. L. R. Co., 84 S. C. 224, 66 S. E. 186 (1909) ; Bartert v. Seehorn,
25 Wash. 261, 65 Pac. 185 (1901).
'DeHoff v. Black, 206 N. C. 687, 175 S. E. 179 (1934).
2 Graves v. Cameron, 161 N. C. 549, 77 S. E. 841 (1913) ; Plumbing Co. v. Hotel
Co., 168 N. C. 579, 84 S. E. 1008 (1915).
'Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C. 291 (1869) ; Osborn v. Leach, 133 N. C.
428, 45 S. E. 783 (1903) ; Stockton v. Mining Co., 144 N. C. 595, 57 S. E. 335
(1907) ; Mfg. Co. v. McQueen, 189 N. C. 311, 127 S. E. 246 (1925).
'Gerrard v. Dollar, 49 N. C. 175 (1856) ; Lee v. Knapp, 90 N. C. 171 (1882);
Mitchell v. Express Co., 178 N. C. 235, 100 S. E. 307 (1919). Cf. Osborn v.
Leach, 133 N. C. 428, 45 S. E. 783 (1903) ; Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C.
291 (1869).
1 Electrolitic Chlorine Co. v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 328 Mo. 782, 41 S. W.
(2d) 1049 (1931) ; Smithers v. Brunkhorst, 178 Wis. 530, 190 N. W. 349 (1922) ;
Loellke v. Grant, 120 Ill. App. 74 (1905). Iowa denies the defendant any right
beyond the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses; IowA CODE (1931),
§11591; Elwell, Lyman & Co., v. Betchell & Ross, 68 Iowa 755, 12 N. W. 273
(1882).
"Parker & Gatling v. Smith, 64 N. C. 291 (1869). See also Graves v. Cameron, 161 N. C. 549, 77 S. E. 841 (1913).
'Lee v. Knapp, 90 N. C. 171 (1882).

